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ABSTRAK 
Artikel ini menganalisis hubungan antara risiko bank dan modal. Dengan mengunakan 
analisis 3SLS penelitian inimenemukan adanya hubungan negatif antara tingkat risiko dan 
modal sektor perbankan. Tingkat aktiva sektor perbankan menunjukkan hubungan positif 
dengan risiko bank, sama halnya dengan krisis moneter 1997. Tingkat kurs rupiah 
terhadap dollar dan pasiva dalam mata uang asing menunjukkan adanya hubungan negatif 
dengan tingkat modal perbankan. Implikasi kebijakan adalah perlunya meningkatkan 
kepatuhan bank pada prinsip kehati-hatian, penambahan modal bank, dan pengawasan 
transaksi bank yang dilakukan dalam mata uang asing 
Kata Kunci: Risk exposure; capital; risk tolerance level; default; moral hazard 
 
INTRODUCTION123 
The road to full-fledged recovery of the 
Indonesian banking sector in the aftermath of 
the devastating 1997 economic crisis continues 
to be elusive, at least in some respects. The 
decision by Bank Indonesia to follow The 
Federal reserve in making a reversal from an 
interest cutting regime (loose monetary policy) 
to an interest rate hiking regime over recent 
months has rekindled fears of yet another 
growth-sapping monetary policy regime to 
come with its attendant credit contraction, 
slower investment, lower output, and rising 
unemployment. Inflation that reached 7.5 
percent by March, 2005, had a year later, 
March, 2006, soared to 15.74 percent4; interest 
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errors and omissions constitute the  responsibility of the 
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2  Is a research fellow at the Center for Asia and Pacific 
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4  Inflation stood at 17.92 in February, 2006 
rate has followed suit, and now hovers around 
12.75 percent, an indication that a spate of 
higher interest rate hikes continues to be a 
strong possibility. Higher Bank Indonesia 
interest rates send signals to bankers that both 
deposit and credit rates have to go up. Deposit 
rates have to move along with inflation if 
savers’ interest in putting their money in banks 
is to be maintained, while credit rates have be 
higher than deposit rates to enable banks pay 
depositors and earn some profit margin as 
compensation for conducting financial 
intermediation. The most quoted of all 
indicators of bank lack of sound health, the 
ratio of non performing loans over total loans 
disbursed has already shown signs of 
increasing, after experiencing a downward 
trend over the past few years. The bank sector 
NPL has risen from 5.8 in percent December 
2004, to 8.3 percent by December, 20055. 
                                                          
5  State-owned banks have even higher NPL than their 
private sector counterparts( for instance Bank Mandiri 
and Bank BNI are reported by The Jakarta post, April, 
20, 2006  to experience 26.7 % and 13.7 % NPL ratios , 
respectively reported to be having NPL banks due to 
legal constraints they face in selling NPL loans (which 
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Basing on the above indicators, one would 
argue that there isn’t a better wakeup call for 
the banking sector to fasten the harness, for 
even worse times to come. 
Worrying though the above signs are, a 
number of indicators show that the long term 
trend of the Indonesian banking system is 
moving toward a gradual, albeit, slow path to 
recovery. Banking sector recovery is 
underpinned by increasingly solid, stable, and 
robust performance of the economy which, 
registered 5.6 percent growth in 2005 higher 
than 5.1 posted in 2004, and is projected to 
surpass the 6 percent mark6 this year (2006).  
Sound, stable and sustainable economic 
growth is vital for sound bank performance. 
Evidence of this is discernible from the level 
of bank deposits, which has steadily increased 
over the past few years, a factor that attests to 
the resurgence of public confidence in the 
financial sector in general, and in the banking 
sector in particular (bank deposits experienced 
a 17.1 percent increase in 2005 increasing 
from Rp. 963.1 trillion (2004) to Rp.1,127.9 
trillion (2005); rising credit level of credit 
disbursement which was Rp. 595.1 trillion 
(2004) and surged by 22.70 percent to 
Rp.730.2 trillion (2005); the level of bank 
assets is upwards being valued at Rp.1272.3 
trillion (2004), experienced an increase of 
15.52 percent to reach Rp. 1469.8 percent 
(2005)). This is an indication that the 
foundation of the banking sector, severely 
rocked by 1997 economic crisis, is slowly but 
surely re-establishing itself as one of the prime 
pillars of the national economy.  
Additionally, one of the most vital 
indicators of bank intermediation, is the Loan 
to Deposit Ratio (LDR). The LDR had by 
December 2005 reached 64.7 percent, a good 
percentage points higher that 61.9 percent 
registered in 2004. The decline in year to year 
                                                                             
are state assets) to third parties, an obstacle that private 
banks do not encounter. 
6  The national budget projected growth rates for 
2006/2007 is 5.3-6.3 percent 
Non Performing Loans Ratio (NPL), is another 
indicator of banking sector recovery. The NPL 
has shown a down ward trend in the year to 
year trend and reached 5.8 percent in 
December, 2004 (if control of the short term 
effects of the petroleum price hike policy 
adopted by the government in April and 
October 20057).  
Encouraging though the above indicators, 
there a shadow continues to linger over 
banking sector total recovery. And factors 
pointing toward that direction aren’t difficult 
to find, either. One such key factor is the slow 
intermediation level registered by the banking 
sector, which though happened to reach the 
64.7 percent in 20058, has shown signs of 
waning as tight monetary policy measures 
undertaken by Bank Indonesia (prime interest 
rate, raising the bank reserve ratio, sucking 
liquidity out of the economy through open 
market operations and fine tuning, have had 
the effect of increasing the cost of funds for 
banks and lenders, over the last quarter, which 
are ringing bells of raising credit risk.  
The Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR), which is 
a good measure of bank intermediation, 
continues to be shy of 100 percent, which is an 
indication that despite accumulating large 
volumes of deposits from customers, banks 
                                                          
7  The current (by December 2005) NPL ratio is 8.3 
percent, consequent upon high inflation rate (17.92 
percent) which came head on heels of a two-phase 
petroleum oil hike. Counter measures against high 
inflation has led to the reversal of the spate of interest 
cuts undertaken by Bank Indonesia prior to October 
2005, raising prime interest rate in a series of phases to 
the current level of 12.75. Such a level of prime interest 
rates has induced banks to raise deposit rates and 
lending rates, which has had adverse impact on loan 
repayment 
8  51 percent of bank credit (2005) went to small and 
medium scale enterprises, an increase from 48.5 percent 
registered the previous year (2004). This was partly due 
to bank reorientation from concentrating lending to the 
corporate sector to SMEs but also as a response to 
demands by  the central bank and the government for 
banks to channel more credit to the sub sector. Many 
banks had to write down and even completely write off 
credit disbursed to SMEs prior to the 1997 crisis due to 
the high default rate 
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continue to shy away from indulging in full-
scale lending to the non-financial sector 
(Corsetti, 1998). The level of bank capital is 
still considered to be a far cry from that 
expected of a sound banking sector, a fact that 
underlies Bank Indonesia efforts to raise 
capital requirements to a minimum of Rp. 80 
billion by 2007. It is undeniable that banks 
have not yet fully recovered from the ‘severe’ 
scars caused by the 1997 economic crisis 
which led to immense “writing-downs” and 
“writing-offs” of NPL , which significantly 
reduced bank capital. One should not ignore 
the fact that the rate of return on bank assets 
has also fallen from 3.5 percent (2004) to 2.6 
percent (2005): an indication of increasing risk 
on bank portfolios, higher cost of funding 
sources due to rising interest rate, and 
decreasing return on investment , among other 
causes. Falling bank profitability is also shown 
by decrease in net interest margin from 6.3 
percent (2004) to 6.2 percent (2005). 
This is coupled by insufficient capital 
contribution made by bank shareholders 
(Lindgren et al., 1996). The woes commercial 
banks continue to suffer are not only attributed 
to shocks caused by the 1997 economic crisis, 
strong as they were, but the seeds of a shaky, 
risk riddled banking sector can be traced as far 
back as 1988, some would even say earlier 
than June 1983. Financial liberation has been 
linked to increasing banking sector risk by 
many researchers (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Fry, 
1995; Cole & Slade, 1998; Kaminsky & 
Reinhart, 1998). In October, 1988, came the 
Pakto 1988 banking reforms which were to 
fundamentally alter all aspects of the 
Indonesian banking system, ranging from the 
players, operations, management, to bank 
products and services. Interest rate on deposits 
and credit was deregulated, which in effect 
reduced control over banks funds mobilization 
and disbursement (read investment). Local 
banks were allowed to open new branches, 
provided pre-conditions were fulfilled. Banks 
incorporated abroad were allowed to open 
local branches, which by so doing intensified 
competition for banking customers in the 
national economy.  
Doubtless increased competition, spawned 
news ways of winning customers from rivals, 
some of which were woefully imprudent. As 
local interest rates rose, commercial banks 
begun to go offshore to countries offering 
funds at lower interest rates. This was because 
despite high cost of funds, the high business 
confidence in the economy, meant that 
potential risk of borrowing high cost funds was 
discounted considerably, especially as the 
economy was registering annual growth rates 
in the 7.0 - 7.8 percent range , domestic 
currency under tight managed float regime, 
inflation under control, and national budget 
deficit proscribed, even if that was more in 
form than in substance (the balanced budget 
stipulation). Banks indulged in offering all 
manner of incentives to attract additional 
customers. This ranged from lotteries, straight 
presents upon opening new accounts, and so 
on.  
The 1988 deregulation package allowed 
national private banks to open and operate 
branches nationwide, a privilege that had 
hitherto been the monopoly of state owned 
banks. Limitations on foreign bank operations 
were loosened significantly, allowing them to 
operate branches in more large cities in 
Indonesia. Many banks begun indulging in 
foreign currency operations and business, 
allowing customers to open up accounts 
denominated in foreign currency units, 
borrowing from abroad and offshore loans 
denominated in foreign currency, and 
extending loans denominated in foreign 
currency as well. The open capital account 
policy adopted by Indonesia during the 1970s 
made this even easier. Such operations were 
conducted with a minimum of risk 
management policies in place, which were 
measures “not totally unjustifiable” under the 
then buoyant economic conditions the 
Indonesian economy enjoyed.  
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No doubt, additional product/service lines 
did not only increase sources of operational 
cost and income, but increased sources of risk 
for banks that had barely had any sound risk 
management programs in place. Moreover, as 
competition in the credit market stiffened, 
banks loosened their credit policy, which led to 
the channeling of credit to borrowers without 
sound business plans, creditworthiness, and 
management acumen. Not a few banks 
extended loans to affiliate companies above 
the limits set by the law, an act that increased 
the possibility of waiving stringent credit 
extension policies. Increased number of banks 
and branches were not accompanied by 
enhanced human resources development in 
bank management as well as in bank 
supervision, which recipe for banking 
operations running under conditions of 
unsound, un prudential banking practices, 
which were brought to light by the 1997 
economic crisis (Chellilah, 1993; Brewer et al., 
1996; Fukuchi, 1995).  
However, the banking sector did have some 
risk management policies. For instance banks 
have had to comply with prudential banking 
principles by among other things adjusting 
bank capital and provisioning in line with 
investment risk, limit their risk exposure, 
limits set on affiliated lending, and tighter 
lending policies imposed.  
Nonetheless, it was not until the 1997 
economic crisis exposed the magnitude of 
bank the malaise that even more stringent 
measures were put in place. This took the 
forms of over-the-limit credit extension to 
single debtors as well as affiliates, large 
overhang of un-hedged offshore borrowing 
sparked by interest differentials between 
domestic and international money markets, and 
large-scale fraud involving bank management 
and shareholders with controlling interests, 
among others.  
Various measures have been taken to plug 
the holes in the Indonesian banking system. 
The banking law No. 10, 1998 has been the 
landmark in reshaping the new bank 
architecture to be in line with sound banking 
principles. The law overhauled the banking 
system, by among other things setting up more 
stringent measures for starting bank operations 
(higher authorized capital levels, permitting 
only personalities with integrity and good track 
record in banking to become bank managers 
and owners, enjoining banks to put in place 
credible credit policies, and risk management 
programs. The law also widened the scope of 
bank activities widened, and henceforth 
included not only conventional banking 
activities of taking deposits and lending 
(intermediation), and information provision, 
but also extended to underwriting securities, 
issuing securities, factoring, and so on. The 
diversification of bank activities meant 
increased source of bank risk, which is why 
banks are obliged to adopt even more sound 
risk management policies.  
That is not to say banks have not been 
obliged to have risk management programs in 
place. Bank Indonesia, for instance, obliges 
banks to have in place asset risk management 
programs, which are line with compliance with 
prudential banking policies. Bank Indonesia 
law No. 23, 1999, by stating its independence 
from the intervention of external interests, 
government interests inclusive, is yet another 
milestone in shaping the new banking system. 
The law stipulates that Bank Indonesia will no 
longer guarantee subsidized credit disbursed 
by commercial banks to lenders, which 
epitomizes vestiges of a policy once adopted 
by the government during periods of financial 
repression to support priority sectors.  
 Henceforth banks have to take ultimate 
responsibility for loans they disburse, meaning 
that any problems in repayment will bear 
heavily on the capital adequacy ratio of the 
respective bank. Banks have to pay premiums 
of between 0.1 and 0.5 percent of deposits 
accumulated to the national deposits insurance 
agency, depending on the degree of their asset 
risk. Moreover, banks have to contend with the 
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maximum limit set on the amount of 
depositors’ funds guaranteed by national 
deposits insurance agency. The government 
has in effect from March 2006, revoked the 
blanket guarantee of all depositors’ funds in 
general banks, which has been in effect since 
1998 to a maximum of Rp. 5 billions per single 
client/debtor. This no doubt creates yet another 
source of risk, which banks must deal with.  
Bank Indonesia has made remarkable 
strides in strengthening the Indonesian banking 
system to enable it stand up to the formidable 
challenges of a fully liberalized financial 
services era, to come into effect in the not too 
distant future. In this vein, Bank Indonesia has 
set in motion a phased implementation of 
Basel II Principles between 2007 and 2010, 
which obliges banks augment their equity to 
Rp. 80 billion, categorizing banks into limited 
activities banks, focused banks, national banks 
and international banks depending on capital; 
beefing up bank infrastructure through the 
establishment of depository insurance agency, 
delimitation functions among national 
depository insurance agency, Bank Indonesia 
and Ministry of Finance concretized by the 
formation of forum for financial system 
stability; and the establishing bank risk 
management certification, which rates and 
ranks bank risk management programs.( Bank 
Indonesia, 2006).  
Bank Indonesia has issued regulations 
aimed at encouraging and bolstering risk 
management policies in general banks. Such 
regulations include Bank Indonesia regulation 
No. 8/4/PBI/2006 on implementation of good 
governance in banks. The regulation obliges 
banks adopt principles of transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, independence, 
and fairness in the conduct of their activities; 
regulation No, 8/2/PBI/2006 on the evaluation 
of productive assets, which in effect obliges 
banks to adopt uniform classification of 
productive assets arising from extending funds 
the same debtor or project, which means 
consolidation of risk arising from such 
investment; and regulation No. 8/6/PBI/2006 
that obliges banks to consolidate risks that 
arise from subsidiaries and associated 
companies through individual and consoli-
dating financial reporting, identification, 
measuring, and controlling risks by adopting 
both individual and consolidated reporting and 
provisioning (Bank Indonesia, 2006). The 
aforementioned efforts were bolstered by 
strengthening, intensifying and focusing bank 
supervision in line with best practices 25 Basel 
core principles. To leave no room for a repeat 
of past bank fraud, imprudence, and 
impropriety, Bank Indonesia established a 
panel of experts drawn from various fields to 
handle bank regulation.  
In anticipation of a flurry of legal action 
involving general banks and third parties in the 
aftermath of the establishment of national 
depositors’ insurance agency, accompanied by 
a limitation of state guarantee of depositors’ 
funds at banks, Bank Indonesia regulation No. 
8/5/PBI/2006 on bank mediation outlines the 
modalities under which such risks can be 
tackled by banks. 
Be that as it may, the catalogue of potential 
risks for banks, if anything shows strong signs 
of increasing. The drivers of bank risk, among 
others, include macroeconomic risk, arising 
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals that 
range from s rise in interest rate (stands at 
12.75 percent today), inflation (17.92 percent), 
fluctuating exchange rate (from Rp.9,8319 
December 2005 to Rp.8980/US$ today), and 
rising budget deficit (government deficit rose 
from 0.7 percent of GDP (2004) to 0.9 percent 
of GDP (2005)). Austere macroeconomic 
fundamentals have sent other sectors jittering 
as evidenced by the effect of a fall in 
consumption expenditure (from a contribution 
of 4.9 percent (2004) to 4.45 percent (2005) to 
GDP growth. Such a trend persists in the first 
quarter of 2006, discernible in the drop to 
                                                          
9  Rupiah /US$ exchange rate rose as high as Rp.10,830 
during the last quarter on 2005 before it recovered at 
Rp.9,831 on December 30, 2005  
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Rp.204.24 trillion in consumption expenditure 
registered in January from Rp.206.69 trillion 
posted in December, 2005. Sluggish consump-
tion expenditure undermines investment 
expenditure recovery. Investment expenditure 
for December 2005 is lower than that 
registered in the previous month, Rp.134.40 
trillion, and Rp.134.40 trillion, respectively. 
The downward trend in investment expenditure 
continues January and February, 2006, with 
Rp.132.37 trillion and Rp.131.31 trillion in 
investment expenditure made, respectively. 
Contraction in consumption expenditure has 
had adverse effects on bank profits. This is 
reflected by an 18.3 percent reduction in 
profits posted by Indonesian banks from 
Rp.29.46 trillion in 2004 to Rp.24.9 trillion 
2005. It is a trend that is likely to persist until 
the middle of the second quarter, 2006 
(Kompas, February 24, 2006).  
Banks continue to face other forms of risks 
which encompass potential risk from entrance 
of new players and products in the financial 
sector which stiffens competition, techno-
logical innovations that make slow adopters 
laggards in products, procedures, and services 
development and delivery, globalization, 
which virtually opens the hitherto captive 
clientele to a variety of choices with respect to 
financial institutions in general and among 
banks in particular to use in the conduct of 
services, products and services available; and 
unavoidable spate of regulations which banks 
must comply with in the process of conducting 
their operations. 
Besides conventional risks emanating from 
non performing loans arising from corporate 
credit disbursement, foreign exchange 
operations, banks are becoming increasingly 
exposed to credit card risk which has been 
attributed to efforts by banks to increase their 
respective shares of the credit market holders’ 
market. Indeed increase in credit card 
transactions is a reflection of the general trend 
the national economy has followed since 
investment suffered what has become a 
protracted decline. The country’s economic 
growth has been driven by consumption, both 
private and government10. The rising NPL on 
credit card transactions is attributed to various 
measures taken by banks to expand the number 
of credit card holders. Such measures range 
from transfer balance on credit cards from one 
bank to the other, transfer credit card balance 
to savings account, providing cash-back offers 
that entail the exemption of the owner from 
paying a certain percentage of some 
transactions, to awarding points per transaction 
paid using the card, which are then converted 
into discounts on new credit card transactions, 
among others 
 Non performing credit to card holders rises 
with rising interest rates, all other factors 
constant. Another contributory factor to high 
credit card transactions default is the reality 
that new card issuing made go to those who 
already have credit cards issued by other banks 
or non bank credit card issuers. This is as 
much reflected in statistics on credit holders 
and number of credit issuance. While the 
number of credit cards issued by December 
2005 was 6.5 million, the number of credit 
card holders was less than half than number at 
3 million. That translates into an average of 2 
credit cards per card holder (The Jakarta Post, 
2006). 
Technology risk continues to be another 
formidable source of risk for banks that do not 
update their operations with the latest front and 
back office service technology, payment 
systems technology, and accounting and 
information system technology, will have to 
relinquish their market share to early 
technology adopters. Commercial banks in 
developing countries in general and Indonesia 
in particular often have to contend with 
another form of risk, which arises from being 
forced to serve as agents of development. This 
is apparent in Bank Indonesia law No. 7/3, 
                                                          
10Consumption contributed 73.7 percent of GDP growth in 
2005, while investment made modest 22 percent 
contribution to GDP in the same period 
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2005 on maximum credit amount extended by 
banks. The law gives exception to state banks 
in their extension of credit to projects that are 
considered of immense social benefit, such as 
infrastructure to exceed the maximum level of 
credit extended by any given bank to a single 
debtor from 20 percent to o 30 percent of bank 
capital (Kompas, Saturday 8, 2006). Funding 
long term, state sponsored projects, is likely to 
widen the mismatch between bank liabilities, 
which are generally short and medium term, 
and bank assets. This constitutes a serious 
source of risk, albeit a forced one for banks to 
bear. 
Bank risk arising from bank mismana-
gement which is manifested in fraud continues 
to bedevil the banking industry, which is 
attests to the persistence of serious flaws the 
failures in bank management, especially credit 
policy and risk management areas, short-
comings in prevailing onsite and offsite bank 
supervision mechanisms, continuing state 
intervention, albeit covert, in the operations of 
state banks, and the lackluster implementation 
of prudential practices already in place. 
It is for this reason that Bank Indonesia 
intends to raise the capital adequacy ratio from 
8 percent in accordance with Basel 1988 to 12 
percent which is accordance with Basel 2003 
arrangement, by 2007. It is in light of such 
conditions under which banks operate which 
continues to be characterized by high risk 
vulnerability, that induced the researcher to 
attempt to analyze the relationship between 
bank risk and capital a bank has, which is 
aimed at identifying empirically, factors 
responsible for bank risk, and the effect such 
risk has on the level of bank equity. The 
second section tackles literature review and 
theoretical framework, while section three 
describes the methodology used. Section four 
presents research findings, while section five 
presents a discussion of research findings. 
Section six draws conclusion, and the last 
section presents policy implications. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORE-
TICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Relationship Between Bank Capital and 
Bank Risk  
One of the most important measures of 
bank soundness is the size of its capital. Banks 
with a good capital base stems a bank from 
insolvency as losses are met from equity 
without irrevocably undermining bank 
performance. Moreover, bank equity provides 
the second line defense against expected risk 
which arises from such conventional sources 
as default on credit disbursed, shortage of 
funding sources, interest rate changes, 
exchange rate fluctuations, and fraud (from 
both internal and external sources), among 
others. Equity has a non linear relationship 
with risk for given a certain portfolio risk, the 
risk of insolvency falls as capital increases. 
However, additional capital is shown to have 
minor effect on risk (McCullough, 1981). It is 
because of this that the effectiveness and 
efficiency of modern bank management owes a 
lot to the extent to which management ensures 
a match between bank capital and assets risk in 
a bank’s investment portfolio.  
Bank supervision has for long advocated 
for a link between a bank’s types of risk 
manifested in its investment activities and its 
capital. Bank’s must avail larger capital 
amounts for investments that are more risky 
than others. The main parameter used by 
central banks in the conduct of their 
supervision of bank operations use the 
CAMEL framework, which was initiated by 
central banks’ banker Basel based bank for 
international settlements. Known as prudential 
banking principles, the CAMEL11 framework 
                                                          
11 Bank performance is rated on a 1 to 5 scale with respect 
to capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, 
earnings performance, and liquidity. A score of 1 on 
each of the five criteria indicates best performance, 
while a score of 5 is an indication of worst performance 
on the respective criterion. Evaluation is also made on a 
composite basis, that the overall performance on all the 
five CAMEL criteria. A composite score of 1 or 2 by a 
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ranks bank soundness on the basis of the 
quality of risk-weighted equity, assets, 
management, earnings performance and 
liquidity (Hefferman, 1998).  
According to Shrieves & Dahl (1994) a 
positive relationship exists between change in 
equity and level of risk on commercial bank 
assets. Such a relationship is found in banks 
with capital adequacy ratios are either above or 
below that stipulated by bank supervisory 
body. The implication is that banks tend to 
adjust bank capital in accordance with asset 
risk, rather than increase investment in risky 
assets without taking account of inherent risk 
levels.  
Financial risk is the possibility that the 
outcome of an action or event could bring up 
adverse impacts in forms of loss in earnings, 
constraints on ability to meet business 
objectives, inhibit bank’s ability to take on 
opportunities that would boost its performance, 
among others. Banks face a variety of risks 
which encompass credit, market, liquidity, 
operational, regulatory, and reputation risks. 
Credit risk arises from the potential that debtor 
may either be unwilling to repay borrowed 
funds, or unable to repay his obligations 
resulting into economic loss to the bank (State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2003). 
Market risk arises from the adverse effects 
that movements in market rates and prices such 
as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity 
prices, credit spreads, and commodity prices, 
among others, have on the value of a bank’s on 
and off balance sheet positions. Liquidity risk 
is the potential loss to a bank that arises from 
either its inability to meet its obligations or to 
fund increase in assets as they fall due without 
incurring unacceptable cost or losses. The bank 
                                                                             
bank is considered satisfactory, while composite scores 
of between 3 and 4 by a bank, implies the ban in 
question has to face additional supervision by the 
authority responsible for bank supervision. Banks with 
composite scores of 4 or 5 are in for close monitoring, 
and a score of 5 is considered by supervisors that the 
bank has a high probabability of failure (Hefferman, 
1998: 233)  
doesn’t have sufficient liquid assets to meet its 
obligations, meaning that it has to resort to 
market sources.  
For a low liquidity bank, obtaining funds 
from the market comes at a premium which 
depends on its illiquidity, the liquidity of the 
market, and the track record of the bank in 
question. Operational risk arises from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people, 
and systems, or from external events. Such risk 
is often associated with human error, system 
failures, inadequate procedures and controls, 
inadequate information systems, technology 
glitches, breaches in internal controls, fraud, 
unforeseen catastrophes.  
In accordance with the mean variance 
school of thought, risk averters maximize 
utility by choosing higher leverage levels than 
equity levels. This means that risk averters 
avoid funding bank operations using equity 
preferring the use of funds from foreign 
sources. The corollary to this is that there is a 
negative relationship between asset risk level 
and equity level. The above relationship is 
attributed to several factors, which among 
others; include taking advantage of fixed 
deposit insurance guarantee imposed by the 
central bank on deposits received by banks. By 
investing deposits into high risk assets, bank 
management maximizes the bank value 
(Diamond & Dybzig, 1986). Bank manage-
ment has the opportunity to attract as many 
bank deposits as possible, which are then 
invested in high risk assets that in turn earn 
high return. 
However, there are factors that inhibit a 
bank from earning high return on very risky 
investments. Such factors include the increase 
in costs banks must pay arising from having 
very risky assets, bankrupt costs or liquidation 
charges, which increase with the risk of assets. 
This implies that banks have an incentive to 
adjust equity level with the level of risk in their 
investments. The corollary to that is that there 
is a positive relationship between the level of 
risk contained in bank assets and level of 
equity.  
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Managing bank risk has become one of the 
most important determinants of a bank’s 
success, measured by its market position. Risk 
management is the ability to measure, monitor, 
control, stem risks comprehensively as a 
decisive parameter for strategic positioning. 
Thus, the degree to which a bank manages the 
variety of risk it faces, determines not only its 
success in today’s world, but its very survival 
as a going concern. 
Commercial banks are also obliged to 
comply with monetary authority rules that call 
for increasing capital level in line with 
increasing level of investment risk. Banks then 
have to pay cost in terms of additional capital 
if the level of risk contained in their 
assets/investments is considered by bank 
supervisors to experience an increase. 
 This is what is known in banking circles as 
prudential banking principles. Banks have to 
comply with prudential banking principles by 
for instance matching the level of assets on 
bank balance sheets with consonant bank 
equity (Flannery, 1989). Bank managers 
having specialized skills are assumed to be 
against experiencing bankruptcy of banks 
under their control as they find it difficult to 
transfer their skills to other trades or business 
sectors. This implies that bank managers are 
risk averters in this context. Thus it is in the 
interest of bank managers to increase the level 
of bank equity/capital to be in line with bank 
asset risk. In other words, bank managers tend 
to reduce the level of risk on assets given bank 
capital level. 
Hypotheses 
1.  Bank risk level has a negative relationship 
with bank equity 
2.  The level of bank equity has a negative 
relationship with the level of bank asset 
risk  
METHODOLOGY 
The research analysis used secondary data, 
which were obtained from the central bureau 
of statistics, Bank Indonesia, and Kompas 
newspaper. The research covers a period 
between 1980-2002.  
The research used the Shrieves & Dahl 
(1992) model to analyze the relationship 
between bank asset risk and bank equity as 
outlined hereunder:  
 CAP  =  0+ 1 LNASSET + 2 REG + 
3  NPL +   (1) 
 NPL  =  0 + 1  CAP + 3 LNASSET + 
    (2) 
Where CAP represents change in level of 
bank equity/capital; LNASSET is natural 
logarithm of bank assets; NPL is change in 
the level of non performing loans,(percentage 
of loans that are above 90 days over total bank 
loans in all banks; REG is the dummy to proxy 
the impact of government regulation on bank 
capital. The complete model comprises three 
equations with the level of bank risk as 
determined by institutional risk rating 
agencies, as dependent variable, and bank 
capital, natural logarithm of bank assets, and 
dummy to represent government policy, as 
independent variables. 
Upon making the simultaneous test, 
Shrieves & Dahl (1992) found that that was 
interdependence between level of bank risk 
and level of bank capital. So the relationship 
between the two variables runs either way 
from bank asset risk to bank capital level and 
from the level of bank capital to bank asset 
risk. There is thus simultaneity in the 
relationship between the two variables. This is 
the underlying reason why the analysis used 
two least squares model 2SLS. This is because 
of the model ability to remove serial 
correlation existing between dependent and 
independent variables. The model used in this 
research was based on that developed by 
Shrieves & Dahl (1992) but opted for 3SLS 
technique due to strong residual covariance. 
The results obtained using the model, were 
then compared with those obtained from the 
cross section model. However, to analyze the 
same variables using both time series and cross 
section models, some changes had to be made 
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on data on commercial banks available. The 
changes made pertaining to data made are 
shown hereunder. The model which was 
eventually used in analyzing the data consisted 
of two equations as appears in the model 
above.  
However, due to the difficulty encountered 
by the researcher to obtain data on commercial 
banks and from an independent bank rating 
agency. Secondly, considering the fact that 
data on almost all variables on all banks were 
difficult to obtain, save just a few with readily 
available data, the researcher had to resort to 
using aggregate data on the banking sector as 
these were readily available in several Bank 
Indonesia and Central Bureau of Statistics 
Publications, and IMF International Finance 
Statistics. Due to the difficulty encountered in 
obtaining data on the level of non performing 
loans NPL in the banking sector, the variable 
was replaced by the total volume of Bank 
Indonesia loans extended to banks12 
.Commercial banks generally avoid borrowing 
funds from the central bank not only because 
of the high cost of such borrowing, but also 
such banks end up being categorized as 
holding risky portfolios13.  
Another variable used as a proxy for NPL 
is the level of liability denominated in foreign 
currency in the banking sector. The two 
variables were used interchangeably during the 
analysis to identify which of the two better 
represents banking sector risk than the other. 
The analysis tools used 3SLS as strong 
residual covariance was evident. 
The model used in model II is as follows: 
                                                          
12 The assumption is that commercial banks only resort to 
borrowing funds from the central bank under conditions 
of low liquidity both internally and from the interbank 
market. Banks that borrow funds from the central bank 
face the danger of being categorized as more risky than 
others and therefore called upon to add more loan 
provisioning and capital 
13 Commercial banks often utilize the lender of the last 
resort facility provided by central banks to overcome 
serious liquidity shortage. The problem is that recipient 
banks suffer from downgrading of the healthy state, 
which automatically increases their ranks on the risk 
rating index.  
LBKEQUI = 0 + 11LBKASS + 
                      12 BREG +13CRIS + 
                      14LBLBI +  (1) 
LBLBI  = 0 + 21LBKEQUI + 
                 22LBKASS+ 23CRIS +    (2) 
Whereby: 
LBKEQUI is the banking sector capital in 
year t ; is total loans extended by Bank 
Indonesia (central bank) to the banking 
sector in year t; LBKASS is total assets in 
the banking sector in year t; BREG is the 
dummy variable indicating when the 
adoption of prudential banking principles 
came into effect in Indonesia in 1992 zero (0) 
represents years before 1992, and one (1) for 
year 1992 and beyond; CRIS is dummy 
variable representing the impact of the 
economic crisis that occurred in 1997 on 
bank capital and risk. The variables assume 
the value zero (0) for years before 1997, 
while 1997 and beyond assume the value of 
one (1). LBFRLIB is the total banking sector 
to foreign creditors; LEXRATE is the 
exchange rate of local currency one dollar 
US; (LCAR is the natural logarithm of the 
capital adequacy ratio while NPLR is the 
natural logarithm of the non performing 
loans on balance sheets of all commercial 
banks, as shown in Table 1).  
Analysis Procedure 
E-Views 3 analysis tool was in 
transforming data and running the model. Data 
was tested for normality and for stationarity by 
observing unit root results. Unit root test used 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test. The Ramsey test 
was used to examine model specification. 
Transformation of data into natural logarithm 
was made using E-Views 3 analysis tool. 
Interpretation of results used 5 percent 
significance error to identify the coefficients 
that were significant. Coefficients with p-value 
lower than 0.05 were identified as significant, 
while those with higher p-value were identified 
as insignificant.  
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PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Table 1. Cross section analysis results of the relationship between bank equity and bank risk  
Model 1 
Dependent Variable: LCAR 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LNPLR -0.04 0.112143  -0.356605 0.7288 
BREG -0.75 0.341794  -2.196828 0.0527 
LBKASS  0.21*** 0.016843 12.59345 0.0000 
R-squared  0.293924     Mean dependent var 2.968554 
Adjusted R-squared  0.152709     S.D. dependent var 0.735689 
S.E. of regression  0.677190     Akaike info criterion 0.257444 
Sum squared resid  4.585860     Schwarz criterion 0.387817 
Log likelihood -11.67338     F-statistic 2.081391 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.088491     Prob(F-statistic) 0.005492 
*** significant at 95 percent, and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively 
Table 2. Three-stage least squares 3SLS analysis results of the relationship between equity and 
commercial bank risk (Model 1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
1 2.095051*** 0.409380 5.117623 0.0000 
2 0.169463 0.227511 0.744855 0.4639 
3 2.899835*** 0.837062 3.464300 0.0021 
 4 -1.711592*** 0.516169 -3.315954 0.0030 
(AR) 0.044632 0.143655 0.310689 0.7588 
1 -0.012518 0.238680 -0.052446 0.9586 
 2 0.003488 0.371406 0.009390 0.9926 
3 1.222010*** 0.271385 4.502872 0.0002 
4 0.678967 0.373308 1.818786 0.0820 
5 0.390410 0.208872 1.869136 0.0744 
(AR) 0.996514*** 0.031554 31.58164 0.0000 
Equation:  LBKEQUI = 1LBKASS + 2BREG + 3CRIS + 4LBLBI + [AR] 
R-squared  0.923511     Mean dependent var 8.926576 
Adjusted R-squared  0.895697     S.D. dependent var 1.144449 
S.E. of regression  0.369612     Sum squared resid 1.502740 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.060064    
Equation: LBLBI =1 LBKEQUI + 2 LEXRATE + 3CRIS + 4 LBKASS +5 LBRES + [AR] 
R-squared  0.888968     Mean dependent var 9.322579 
Adjusted R-squared  0.842705     S.D. dependent var 0.718648 
S.E. of regression  0.285019     Sum squared resid 0.974832 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.090055   
*** significant at  95 percent , and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively 
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Table 3 . Three stage least square analysis Results of the relationship between bank equity and 
bank risk (Model 3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
1 LBKASS  0.140500 0.112710 1.246558 0.2233 
2 LBLBI -0.109780 0.098303 -1.116759 0.2739 
( AR)  1.028684*** 0.004726 217.6573 0.0000 
1 LBKEQUI -0.388538*** 0.112149 -3.464473 0.0018 
2 LBKASS  1.071422*** 0.085315 12.55849 0.0000 
3 CRIS  0.122489 0.208741 0.586796 0.5622 
(AR)  0.052701 0.136815 0.385200 0.7031 
Equation: LBKEQUI =  1LBKASS +2LBLBI + [AR] 
R-squared 0.989435     Mean dependent var 8.936453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.988026     S.D. dependent var 1.293163 
S.E. of regression 0.141503     Sum squared resid 0.300345 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.896782   
Equation: LBLBI = 1LBKEQUI +2LBKASS + 3CRIS + [AR] 
Observations: 16 
R-squared 0.828534     Mean dependent var 9.197137 
Adjusted R-squared 0.785668     S.D. dependent var 0.458628 
S.E. of regression 0.212326     Sum squared resid 0.540990 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.050409   
*** significant at 95 percent , and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Analysis results obtained from cross 
section data, 2000 shows the existence of a 
negative relationship between the Non 
Performing Loans Ratio (NPL), and Capital 
Adequacy Ratio (CAR). This implies that 
banks which have problematic/risky assets do 
not have Capital Adequacy Ratio that is in line 
with such asset risk levels. This is due to the 
existence of a safety valve in forms of 
government blanket guarantee of bank liability 
and bank recapitalization. Banks used to have 
bad quality assets which meant that they had 
higher non performing loans levels than their 
capital adequacy ratios. Total bank assets show 
a positive relationship with capital adequacy 
ratio, which is an indication that banks have 
large volumes of poor quality assets with the 
consequence that they are obliged to augment 
bank equity in order for banks to continue 
complying with mandatory minimum capital 
adequacy ratios as set by Bank Indonesia.  
Research results exhibit the expected 
negative relationship between banking sector 
risk -1.71 (-3.32) as represented by Bank 
Indonesia liquidity credits disbursed to banks 
(BLBI), and bank assets. Banking system 
assets are found to have a positive influence on 
bank equity and liquidity disbursed by the 
central bank 2.1 (5.12), and 0.68 (1.8), 
respectively (table 2). Equity level in the 
banking system has a negative influence on the 
level of Bank Indonesia liquidity support 
disbursed by Bank Indonesia -.39, (-3.46) 
(Table 2 and Table 3). 
The positive relationship between level of 
bank assets and bank equity is proof of the 
success achieved by the prudential banking 
policy as stipulated by the central bank. By 
linking bank asset risk with equity level, 
prudential banking principles, reduce adverse 
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selection and moral hazard. The dummy 
variable BREG shows a positive but 
insignificant magnitude. Most assets of 
commercial banks constitute loans that carry 
high default risk, which is why banks should 
have high capital levels from which deduction 
are made in case potential default risk becomes 
actual default risk. Bank capital serves as a 
cushion that absorbs loan defaults which is a 
normal occurrence for commercial banks. So 
according to data obtained from Bank 
Indonesia and The National Bureau of 
Statistics, the Indonesian banking system has 
succeeded in implementing prudential banking 
principles, which took effect in 1992, and 
augmented in 1994 and 1998 (through the 
Banking Law No. 10, 1998). 
Research results indicate that large banks in 
terms of assets received equally large volume 
of Bank Indonesia liquidity support. There are 
two reasons to explain such a relationship. One 
explanation is that banks with huge assets are 
too big to fail, hence governments, through the 
central bank, try the best they can to prevent 
bankruptcy. The justification often advanced 
by the government in bailing out large banks, 
is the attempt to prevent systemic risk that can 
ensue from bankruptcy and collapse of a major 
lender in an economy. Allowing a big lender to 
go under, tantamount to sending a bad signal to 
depositors that their money is not safe, which 
can induce runs on all banks as public 
confidence in banking system wanes. The 
effect of a full-scale bank run is arguably more 
costly than bailing out large, albeit troubled 
lenders. Another explanation is most assets in 
commercial banks constituted of poor quality 
assets, in other words risky, which meant that 
banks had to put up equally large capital levels 
commensurate with the high risk. The latter 
reason is given more weight given the fact that 
large banks were found to have large volumes 
of non performing loans, especially in the 
aftermath of the convulsive 1997 economic 
crisis. Many banks also has had large volume 
of loans known as green accounts, which were 
in reality in default but reported as performing 
loans to avoid falling into lower risk ranking.  
Research findings also show the existence 
of a negative relationship between bank 
liability owed to foreign creditors and the level 
of bank capital/equity. The relationship is 
caused by the effect of that exchange rate of 
the local currency IDR against hard currency 
such as US dollar, on bank assets and liquidity. 
An appreciation of the Rupiah increases the 
value of bank assets as well as bank liability 
denominated in the local currency, while a 
depreciation of the local currency lowers the 
value of bank assets and also bank liability 
denominated in local currency (Table 2 and 
Table 3). However, depreciation of the local 
currency, though lowers liability denominated 
in local currency, also has the negative effect 
of lowering the value of bank assets 
denominated in Rupiah as well as increasing 
the value of liability denominated in foreign 
currency.  
The economic crisis that hit Indonesia and 
other East Asian economies from mid 1997, 
increased bank risk , which made it imperative 
for Bank Indonesia to supplement bank 
liquidity by extending liquidity support (see 
the crisis dummy in the two equations in table 
2). Bank liquidity support was aimed at 
reducing the impact of the economic shock on 
the Indonesian banking system, and by so 
doing, preventing the economy from 
descending into even deeper doldrums. The 
1997 economic crisis adversely affected the 
level of bank capital both in the short term and 
long term. It was in order to sterilize the 
economy from even worse effects that induced 
the government to inject Rp. 154 trillion into 
banks which took the form of state bonds to 
keep the banking system afloat by increasing 
equity. This is attested by the CRIS dummy in 
equation I in Table 2, which shows a positive 
and significant value. 




Basing on research findings, the level of 
bank risk , proxied by Bank Indonesia liquidity 
support has a negative influence on bank 
capital. This is because banks, which receive 
liquidity support from the central bank have 
their asset portfolio performance down graded 
, an indication of high risk. Bank performance 
took nosedive during and after the 1997 
economic crisis, which is why Bank Indonesia 
liquidity support increased significantly (see 
CRIS dummy in equation 2 in Bable 2). The 
level of bank assets has a positive influence on 
the level of Bank Indonesia liquidity support.  
Bank transactions denominated in foreign 
currency, were found to have a negative 
influence on bank capital level due to high 
potential risk. The factor of risk became the 
more important on the advent of the 1997 
economic crisis as illustrated in the second 
equation in Table 2 above. The magnitude of 
the EXRATE variable (IDR per US$) 
increases in the wake of the 1997 economic 
crisis. 
The impact of the 1997 economic crisis on 
bank performance took the form of increasing 
the risk banks face in their operations 
especially with regard to liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency. High risk 
made government intervention imperative 
which came in form of bank recapitalization to 
mitigate the impact of the crisis on the entire 
economy.  
The implementation of prudential banking 
principles commenced some time back in 
1992. Nonetheless, as research results indicate, 
it is still a long way for all banks to conduct all 
their operations in accordance with such 
principles, which should change bank 
management orientation from risk-taking to 
risk averse. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There is need for increasing (read 
intensifying) bank supervision to ensure all 
banks comply with prudential principles in the 
conduct of their operations. This should 
discourage banks from investing in high risk 
investments, without augmenting bank capital, 
as is prescribed by law. The gradual rolling 
back of government sponsored blanket 
guarantee of bank assets, and demanding banks 
to pay premium to the national deposit 
insurance agency in accordance with the level 
of risk of assets in bank portfolio are two right 
steps in the right direction. Bank Indonesia ‘s 
intention to focus on a bank’s major source of 
risk in its regular supervision exercise, if 
implemented, should prevent blanket 
categorization of bank risk, which will augur 
well for more effective supervision and bank 
asset management (The Jakarta Post , Monday, 
March 27, 2006).  
In order to enhance bank performance, 
measures should be taken to ensure that bank 
management puts in place and implements 
standard and flexible risk management policies 
and programs that in consonance with bank 
activities. This will ensure that such programs 
will be in line with the type and level of risks 
banks face, which are reflected in the types of 
activities a bank engages in. Such risk 
management policies should be underpinned 
by sound and universally proven risk 
management models. As the main source of 
risk commercial banks face is in form of credit 
risk, more measures should be taken in that 
direction. Measures that should be taken, 
among others, include setting up credit risk 
management committee/section in the bank, 
which should be responsible for implementing 
credit risk level set by the bank management. 
The committee should assess borrower risk 
profile, measures to quantify such risk, 
determine whether the risk level is in line with 
the risk level set by bank management, 
communicate to all sections about bank risk 
profile, ways of mitigating such risks, and 
sanctions awaiting those who violate standards 
set. Credit risk monitoring should be regularly 
done to ensure bank risk is within the tolerance 
levels set by top management. 
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There is no effective risk management 
program that can succeed without the support 
of top management. This is because the 
ultimate responsibility of bank performance is 
with top management under the supervision of 
the board of directors. They set the risk profile 
they deem appropriate for the bank, appoint 
personnel that ensures stipulations on risk level 
are maintained as well as putting in place 
incentive packages for those whose activities 
help to reduce bank risk, and sanctions for 
those who violate them. They also provide 
human, material, and financial resources that 
facilitate the execution of an effective risk 
management program possible . This is much 
in line with the new approach adopted by bank 
for international settlements that emphasizes 
individual banks to identify risk profile they 
have and design risk management program that 
best reduce even eliminate risks they face.  
Top management is also vital in ensuring 
the introduction, instilling, and maintenance of 
a risk control culture in the bank. This should 
be reflected, among others, in policies, 
processes, procedures in place to report risks 
that occur and those likely to occur, in the 
course of conducting bank businesses with and 
w\outside the organization, mitigate risks, and 
feasibility of alternative risk limitation and 
control strategies Of course such efforts should 
be under the observation and supervision of 
bank supervisory bodies. 
Bank supervision must be made more 
effective by for instance increasing the 
regularity of on-site and off site supervisory 
services, combining bank rating systems using 
comprehensive bank risk assessment systems, 
with financial ratio and peer group analysis 
systems and statistical models. The vital 
importance of commercial banks in developing 
economies means that while bank management 
and directors may have their role in 
determining risk tolerance levels and designing 
appropriate risk management strategies and 
programs enhanced, central banks /bank 
supervisory agencies must ensure bank risk 
tolerance levels and strategies taken to mitigate 
them are commensurate with internal standards 
(Sahajwala & Van Den Bergh, 2000).  
Now time for a caveat. The recommen-
dations made are based on the results of the 
research analysis made. Research analysis can 
not stand on its own without data that formed 
the backbone of it. Besides, the statistical tool 
used, data used in the analysis played a vital 
role in influencing the empirical results 
attained herein. Thus, the findings made here 
are as good as the data that was used in 
reaching the results. 
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